THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

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EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES

For

NAVY GRADUATE COMPTROLLERSHIP COURSE
Business Administration
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PREFACE

It was my intention in this thesis to present an unbiased review of the chronological steps in the development of the present Defense Organization of the United States; however, I found it very difficult to keep this objective view during the course of my research and writing. Being a part of the Navy, I found myself taking the Navy side in the fight over unification, and being an admirer of the late Mr. Forrestal, I found myself taking his side. Although this bias of mine dominated my thinking, I tried not to let it dominate my writing. In short, I tried to present the facts as I saw them and not as I would like to have seen them through eyes blurred with bias, loyalty and prejudice.

The bibliography is not meant to be all-inclusive, as a large volume of material has been written on the subject, especially the unification phase. I found considerable of the material had been heavily slanted toward either the Army or Navy view. I selected only sufficient background material to bring out the basic issues and opposing viewpoints in each step of the evolution of the Defense Organization.

My purpose in writing this thesis was twofold: first, to satisfy one of the requirements for a Master's Degree, and second, to build a background of knowledge and to set a point of departure from which to study the "Evolution of the Organization of the Navy Department," which I intend to propose as my second term thesis.

And why these two studies? During a tour of duty in the Pentagon,

I was brought into contact with the Organizations of Defense, Army and Air Force, as a result of my duties in opnav and additional duty on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From this contact grew a desire to better understand the Organizations of Defense, Army and Air Force, as well as my own Navy Department.

C.R. D.

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense Organization of the United States, as it is known today, has developed in four basic steps. These milestones of evolution are:

1. Pre World War II organization
2. World War II temporary organization
3. Unification
4. Post Unification modifications

The early history of the national defense organization is both varied and colorful. Surprisingly enough, we had unification at the beginning, when the Navy was under the War Department.

However, the most important precedent set at the beginning of our National Defense Organization was that of civilian control. Civilian leadership over our military forces was provided by the Constitution: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States."[1/] In addition to this Constitutional provision, George Washington extended civilian control by appointing a civilian as the first Secretary of War. The principle of civilian control of the military has continued to this day in all aspects of the Defense Department Organization. This principle has been the major motivating influence in the evolution of the Department

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1 U. S. Constitution, Article 2, Paragraph 2.

Chapter 1

Introduction

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of Defense Organization. As will be seen in Chapter IV, this principle not only motivated for unification, but at the same time mitigated against unification.

With the establishment of the Navy as a separate Department, the history of the Defense Organization until World War II is the history of the separate Departments of War and Navy.

The second phase of the evolution of the National Defense Organization occurred during World War II when unification had its beginning in fact if not in name. President Roosevelt appointed Admiral William D. Leahy as the Chief of Staff to the Commander-In-Chief, to assist him in co-ordinating the military efforts of the War and Navy Departments. A second major step towards unification during this phase was the establishment of and successful operation of unified commands of ground, air and naval forces. A third major step during this phase was the gradual evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other steps during this phase were taken in the creation of government agencies, such as the War Production Board, to integrate the military effort with the civilian effort.

The third phase in the evolution of the Defense Organization was the debate on Unification in 1945-6-7 with the eventual passing of the National Security Act of 1947. The basic features of the Act stemmed from the Eberstadt Report which was prepared by the request of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. The Act established the National Military Establishment with a Secretary of Defense as a coordinator, and three Departments of Army, Navy and Air with Secretaries as Cabinet members with direct access to the President. In addition, the Act created the Department of Air Force, National Security Council, the Central Intelligence

Agency, the National Securities Resources Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. Several of the above had been in existence and merely had their names changed or were legally recognized. The National Security Act of 1947 was an epoch milestone in the history of the Defense Organization of this country.

The fourth and final phase in the development of our Defense Organization is the post unification period (1947 to date) in which the National Security Act of 1947 has been modified by the amendments of 1949 and 1952 and the Reorganization Plan Number Six of 30 June 1953. The major effect of these amendments has been to increase the civilian control over the military by centralization of more power in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Of major interest to the Navy Graduate Comptrollership Class is the addition of the Comptrollership function in the Defense Organization by the addition of the Title IV to the National Security Act of 1947.

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Chapter II

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

The Defense Organization of the United States prior to World War II was a two-department system composed of the War and Navy Departments with the exception of a short period in the early history of the country (1789 to 1797) when the War Department contained both the Army and the Navy. Thus the history of the Defense Organization prior to World War II is the separate histories of the War and Navy Departments. An important exception to this generalization is the establishment of the philosophy of civilian control of the military organization as noted in Chapter I.

In general, the history of the War Department was an evolutionary process accelerated by wars in which a decentralized organization was centralized under the general staff concept. Major General Nelson has fully chronicled this evolution in his excellent book, "National Security and the General Staff." A resume' of his views on this evolution are quoted:

"Throughout our nation's history, our organization for national defense has been so shackled in the grip of the past, that at times nothing short of catastrophe could release it. It took the disgraceful events of the Spanish-American War combined with the heroic efforts of a great Secretary of War, Elihu Root, to establish a General Staff to plan for the future. And it took five years to put that basic idea across. During World War I it was not until the whole supply establishment was about to break down that action was taken to reorganize

industrial mobilization under Bernard Baruch and the supply set-up in the War Department and the Army under General Goethals. After World War I, it took two years and General Pershing's prestige to secure the National Defense Act of 1920. In World War II, it took the Pearl Harbor tragedy to precipitate effective action to reorganize the War Department and to constitute at least a semblance of necessary top machinery, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization."[2/]

The Navy Department has maintained its decentralized organization since the establishment of the bureau system in 1842. The major changes in this organization have continued this policy of decentralization by creating the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Industrial Relations, Naval Material, Naval Research, Judge Advocate General, General Counsel, Analysis and Review, Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserve, and Comptroller.

A detailed history of the evolution of the Navy Department Organization by the emminent naval historian S. E. Morison is given in Ferdinand Eberstadt's book on the "Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Defense."

The organizational philosophy of the Army, of centralized civilian responsibility, authority and control in the Secretary of War, with the single line of authority through the Chief of Staff, and the Navy organizational philosophy of centralized civilian responsibility in the Secretary of the Navy, with decentralized authority and control in the

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2 Major General Otto Lauren Nelson, Jr., U. S. Army (Ret.) -"National Security and the General Staff" (Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1946), p. 569

various bureaus and offices, with no single military officer responsibility, led to the difference of opinion as to how the Defense Organization was to be unified. The Army wanted a single Department of Defense and the Navy wanted a Federation.

This conflict of philosophies continues to this day.

Chapter III

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION DURING WORLD WAR II

The Defense Organization at the advent of World War II was the two separate Departments of War and Navy coordinated by the President with national policy leadership in the State Department. The shock of Pearl Harbor changed this situation in two ways: one was the reorganization of the Navy and War Departments and the second was the establishment of organizational machinery to coordinate the defense effort. This failure to be ready for World War II with a Defense Organization capable of fighting it, set the stage for later demands for unification.

The Navy Department was the first to feel the change:

"King was. . .summoned to Washington, and, arriving Tuesday morning, 16 December. . .was taken to the White House by the Secretary, and two days later, on the eighteenth, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8984 'Prescribing the Duties of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and the co-operative Duties of the Chief of Naval Operations.'. . .

"It provided that the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, 'shall have supreme command of the operating forces. . .and shall be directly responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the President of the United States.'

"A radical change in naval administration was accomplished by this order. As will be recalled from earlier chapters, the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, having never been precisely defined, had been the subject of much controversy and deliberation. The 1915 legislation

creating the office had provided that he 'shall, under the direction of the Secretary, be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.' But neither this law, nor any subsequent one, had given him authority over the bureaus of the Navy Department that built, manned, supplied, and maintained the fleet. During more than a quarter of a century the great majority of the Chiefs of Naval Operations had felt the inconsistency of this situation, and had become convinced that the powers of the office should extend over the activities of the bureaus.

". . .On 12 March, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9096 providing that 'the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations may be combined and devolve on one officer. . .who shall be the principal naval advisor and executive to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the Naval Establishment. . .As Chief of Naval Operations. . .shall be charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy. . .with the coordination and direction. . .of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.'"3/

The Navy Department continued to operate under these two executive orders throughout the war as a highly centralized organization under the Secretary and his military executive, Fleet Admiral King.

The Department of War reorganized in 1942, in a similar effort to translate into a workable wartime organization.

Early February 1942 also saw the evolution of organizational means

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3 E. J. King and W. M. Whitehill, "Fleet Admiral King," (New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1952) pp. 349-356

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3 [illegible]

to coordinate the defense effort. One of these actions established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An Army version of this evolution follows:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization emerged because some agency of the sort was essential in our dealings with the British - and in determining quickly over-all military policy and strategy. General Marshall accompanied the President in his meetings with the British Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff in August 1941 and in December 1941 and January 1942. Although admittedly an overstatement, there is a basis for the allegation that the necessity for allied unity of action and coordination forced the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces to devise a speedier and more effective means of collaboration. Certainly Joint Army-Navy Boards did already exist but they were inadequate.

"Curiously, the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff just grew. In recognition perhaps of the delicate situation that arises when jealously guarded perogatives elbow one another, there was no general understanding on the part of anyone on what constituted the articles of organization or the charter of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was probably better that these were left unsaid or at least unadvertised, and that the organization and procedure were permitted to evolve gradually."4/

A Navy version of the same event in history:

"One might gather from arguments heard later, when the so-called Unification Bill was being considered by Congress, that there never had been any real co-operation between the Army and Navy. The truth is that

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4 Nelson, Op. Cit. p. 397

many problems common to both services had been solved satisfactorily through the operation of a Joint Board which dated back to 1903. The President, foreseeing that events probably would make it necessary for him to exercise his Constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, had the Joint Board placed under his direction in 1939.

". . .When Prime Minister Churchill and his aides came to Washington shortly after the war began in December 1941, it was apparent that the Joint Board had to be revised, given more power, and placed on a basis where it could work side by side with the already functioning British Chiefs of Staff. Thus was created the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, which held its first meeting in February, 1942, and which absorbed the functions of the old Joint Board.

"The Joint Chiefs became the principal agency for Army-Navy-Air Force coordination. Its duties during the war were never defined precisely. I have heard that in some file there is a. . .memorandum from Roosevelt, setting up the Joint Chiefs, but I never saw it. . .The Joint Chiefs of Staff was an instrument of the Commander-in-Chief and was responsible to him. I was his representative on that body. As senior officer present, I presided at its meetings, prepared the agenda, and signed all the major papers and decisions."[5]

In addition to the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Coordination of the defense effort was the appointment of Fleet Admiral Leahy as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief on July 20, 1942 following the suggestion of General Marshall. The most important function

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5 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, "I Was There" (New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950) pp. 101-102

of the Chief of Staff was:

"the maintaining of daily liaison between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was my job to pass on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the basic thinking of the President on all war plans and strategy. In turn I brought back from the Joint Chiefs a concensus of their thinking."[6]

In addition to the internal reorganizational efforts in the War and Navy Departments and the establishment of the Joint Chiefs and Staffs and Fleet Admiral Leahy as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, there were numerous other agencies evolved to correlate the civilian and the defense effort during the war.

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6 Ibid. p. 101

Chapter IV

UNIFICATION

The fourth and major phase of the evolution of the Defense Organization was the so-called Unification of the Armed Forces. As will be seen later in this chapter, "unification" is the common term used to describe the total Defense Organization established by the National Security Act of 1947.

As early as 30 August, 1944, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal wrote: "The question of a single Department of Defense. I do not think for a moment we can take this lightly, and I have so told Admiral King."7/

On 18 April, 1945 Secretary Forrestal and Admiral King had a meeting with President Truman, after which the Secretary wrote:

"Single Department of Defense: I made the suggestion that he reread the Morrow Board Report with the thought that this form might be followed in the study of the desirability of consolidating the two Services."8/

On 9 May, 1945 Forrestal had a luncheon for Admiral King, General Marshall and Harry Hopkins:

"The purpose of that lunch was to explore with King and Marshall the possibility of the Army and Navy reaching an agreement as to the form of our postwar national defense.

". . .Marshall. . .said that he was unshakably committed to the

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7 Walter Millis (Ed.), "The Forrestal Diaries" (New York, The Viking Press, 1951) p. 9
8 Ibid. p. 60

thesis of a single civilian Secretary with a single military Chief of Staff. . .

"I said that the Navy could not concur in the conception of a single department but would go a long ways to meet the Army's view on any reasonable system of cooperation and coordination."[9]

On May 15, 1945, in a letter to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman, Committee on Naval Affairs, stated:

"I feel quite sure you will agree with me that the effective methods of coordination developed by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces, during the present war should be continued in the postwar era. It is realized that many good arguments can be presented both for and against a consolidation of the present War and Navy Departments into a Department of National Defense with sub-departments for land, naval, and air forces. I am not convinced, however, such a consolidation is the best possible solution to the problem of coordinating our defense efforts."[10]

Senator Walsh then gave the pros and cons of a single Department of Defense as he saw it and suggested as an alternative to Unification that a Council on National Defense be created with the following standing committees in a staff capacity:

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2. Research Committee
3. Procurement Committee

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9 Ibid. p. 60
10 Ferdinand Eberstadt, "Unification of War and Navy Department and Postwar Organization for National Defense" (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1945) p. III

4. Committee on Military Personnel

5. Committee on Civil Personnel

Senator Walsh concluded his letter as follows: "I suggest that you consider the question of having the Navy Department make a thorough study of this subject to determine whether or not it would be desirable for it to propose the establishment of a Council on National Defense as an alternative to the proposal now pending that the Army and Navy Departments be consolidated into a Department of National Defense."[11/]

Secretary Forrestal replied in a letter to Senator Walsh on May 27, 1945 in part as follows: "Your point of view corresponds substantially to what is taking shape in my own mind, namely, that the Navy Department cannot be in the position of merely taking the negative in this discussion, but on the contrary must come up with positive and constructive recommendations. Certainly there are many gains in Army-Navy cooperation which have developed in this war and which should not be lost. Outside of the purely military area, there were great lessons learned in the process of mobilizing the Nation's resources for war which should be carefully recorded; the mechanisms of securing and keeping up to date the information of our industrial capacity, raw material stockpiles, etc., should be kept in being."[12/]

Shortly thereafter, on June 19, 1945 Secretary Forrestal wrote Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt asking him to make a study and prepare a report:

". . .with recommendations on the following matters:

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11 Ibid. p. IV
12 Ibid. p. V

"1. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our national security?

"2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve our national security?

"3. What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other governmental departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?"[13]

In view of the magnitude of the job and the limited time available, Mr. Eberstadt broke down the subject matter into topics and assigned one individual responsibility of collecting and evaluating the background information and facts from published and unpublished documents and reports and from correspondence and interviews while at the same time retaining full responsibility for the studies and for the conclusions and recommendations.

On conclusion of the study, Mr. Eberstadt forwarded his report to Secretary Forrestal on September 25, 1945 as an enclosure to a letter in which he stated:

"Military efficiency is not the only condition which should influence the form of our postwar military organization. To be acceptable, any such organization must fall within the framework of our traditions and customs. It must be of such size and nature as to command public support. It must be aimed at curing the weaknesses disclosed in the

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13 Ibid. p. 1

late wars. And finally, it must be conducive to fostering those policies and objectives which contribute to the service and protection of our national security. . .The military services are but a part of the national machinery of peace or war. An effective national security policy calls for active, intimate and continuous relationships not alone between military services themselves, but also between the military services and many other departments and agencies of government.

". . .We have attempted to sketch the major organizations and relationships which are involved in promoting the maintenance of peace or, in default of this, in marshalling our national resources fully, promptly, and effectively in our defense.

"We have suggested new organizational forms responsible to our new world position, our new international obligations, and the new technological developments emerging from the war.

"Throughout this report, we have kept in mind two major conditions precedent to effective operation of any form of organization:

"1. That all organizational forms must remain sufficiently flexible not only to permit, but to encourage, such changes in method and policy as are necessary to meet changing conditions.

"2. That experience does not indicate, nor study disclose, any organizational substitute for alert and competent men in positions of authority and responsibility.

". . .Delivery of this report constitutes fulfillment of the task outlined in your letter."14/

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14 Ibid. pp. 1-2

On October 18, 1945 Secretary Forrestal enclosed a copy of the Eberstadt report in a letter to Senator Walsh in which he said:

". . .A great many of the opinions being voiced on both sides of this question were based upon extremely broad generalizations concerning the experience of this country during the war or upon a purely prior reasoning. My own mind was not nearly so clear on the matter except that I was and I am certain that it is one of the gravest importance to the Nation and one that should not be resolved without the most painstaking and exhaustive examination of all the facts bearing upon the problem.

"His report. . .brings to the fore many factual considerations which have tended to be all too easily overlooked in such public discussions of the matter."[15]

On 20 December, 1945 President Truman sent a message to the 79th Congress calling for consolidation of the armed forces and the creation of a single Department of Defense. This request resulted in the creation of a special sub-committee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee to write a bill for the unification of the Armed Forces. The resultant bill (known as the Thomas Bill, named after Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah) was introduced to Congress on 9 April 1946. This Bill provided for a relatively centralized Department of Defense headed by a Secretary, Under-Secretary, and four functional assistant Secretaries, and with three Secretaries for War, Air, and Navy.

Hearings started on the Thomas Bill on 1 May, 1946.

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15 Ibid. p. VI

"These hearings, conducted in public through the first weeks of May, immediately brought the fires of controversy, which had been smoldering behind the curtains of official reticence, to a fine blaze. Forrestal appeared before the committee on May 1. . .His central point was that the Thomas Bill, while setting up an organizational structure, had not really thought through any of the specific and very practical problems of organization with which that structure would have to deal; though much more elaborate than the simple proposals originally advanced by the Army, it still rested on the premise of 'merge now and organize later.'"16/

It was obvious at this time that the President's message to Congress on 20 December, 1945 was sent without agreement within his administration on the method of unification. In view of the controversy raging due to the open hearings on the Thomas Bill, President Truman called a White House conference on 13 May, 1946 of his civilian and military leaders of his defense organization.

"The President said he would like the Army and Navy to get together to identify their points of agreement and disagreement with regard to legislation looking to coordination of the two Departments. He said he was not prejudiced in favor of one Service or the other -- what he wanted was a balanced system of national defense with particular reference to the integration of the budget. . .

"The President asked Admiral Leahy his views and Admiral Leahy said he thought something could be worked out provided the proposed

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16 Op. Cit. p. 159

bill eliminated the single Chief of Staff. He said his experience during the war had convinced him that the idea of a single Chief of Staff was dangerous. . .Admiral Leahy added that he thought the sphere of activities of naval aviation could be worked out by agreement. On the future position and scope of the activities of the marines, he stated that he was inclined to agree with the views of General Eisenhower. . .(that while he did not favor maintaining two different armies with the same missions, he would be the last to advocate the 'abolition' of the Marines.)

"When the President asked the Secretary of War for his comments, Patterson replied. . .that he still felt the greatest efficiency would be obtained by the formation of a single Department, with a single Secretary and a single Chief of Staff. . .

". . .(This meeting represented a decisive victory for Forrestal, largely reversing the effects of the defeat he had suffered in December with the President's initial message on unification. . .His chosen tactics of patient pressure, persuasion, and, above all, a thorough grounding in the essentials of the problem and a complete understanding of all the factors that were in it, had paid off. The President had come around to view that a single Chief of Staff was 'dangerous'. . . If in the end Forrestal was largely the winner in the unification fight, it was because he had thought more deeply, because he had enlisted Eberstadt and others to think for him, because he had looked at the real and central problems involved rather than accepted quick solutions which under the test of time and events could not stand.)"[17]

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17 Millis, Op. Cit. pp. 160-162

Following this meeting with the President, the Navy and Army civilian and military leaders got together to try and reach a compromise solution to the unification problem to meet the President's deadline of May 31. As a result, the areas of differences were narrowed. The Army acceded to the idea of a Council of Common Defense (National Security Council), a National Security Resources Board, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a Munitions Board and gave up pressing for a single Department of Defense with a Chief of Staff for the Secretary of Defense and a straight line of command of the Service Departments. The only remaining major point of difference was the powers to be given to the Secretary of Defense, i.e., coordination (Navy view) versus administrative control (Army view). Minor points of difference were the Army's resistance on the Air Force responsibility for all air resources and limited functions of the Marine Corps. It is interesting to note that the Navy not only opposed giving up its air arm to the new Air Force but also to the Army's idea of giving up its own troop support air arm to the new Air Force.

On 31 May, 1946 the Secretaries of War and Navy wrote a joint letter to the President outlining the areas of agreement and disagreement.

On 15 June, 1946 President Truman wrote a letter to Congress laying down a twelve point program on which unification should be established. However, Congress convened without taking action on unification.

On 16 January, 1947, the Secretaries of War and Navy sent a joint letter to President Truman reconciling Army and Navy views on the int-

egration of the Armed Services.

On 26 February 1947, the President forwarded a unification bill (S 758) to the Senate, having been drafted by the representatives of the armed services and having the approval of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This Bill was referred to the Committee on Armed Services on 3 March, 1947.

Hearing started on 18 March, 1947 and lasted ten weeks, afforded a full opportunity to the representatives of all government departments and agencies and to all private citizens to be heard. This public hearing was followed by executive sessions of the Armed Services Committee starting on 20 May, 1947 which culminated in a vote of 12 to 0 for the bill on 4 June 1947.

On 25 July 1947 Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253 - 80th Congress). On 26 July 1947 President Truman signed this act and at the same time signed an Executive Order deferring the roles and missions of the Services and appointed Secretary of the Navy Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense.

In terms of the Senate Report:

"This act has been designed to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States. It does this by provisions involving three levels of the Government. On the highest level, under the immediate supervision of the President, it provides for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and functions of the Government relating to the National Security. On a lower level, it provides for three independently administered military departments, and provides further for their authori-

tative coordination and unified direction, but not merger, under civilian control. Finally, on the military level, it provides for the effective strategic direction of the Armed Forces, for their operation under unified control, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

"Studies made. . .show the need for close and continuous coordination on a high level within the Government of our domestic, foreign, and military policies, for an appropriate intelligence organization to serve both military and civilian agencies of security, and for vastly improved planning for control and utilization of our natural and industrial resources in time of emergency."[18]

In brief, the National Security Act of 1947 provided:

Sec. 2 Declaration of Policy

Title I Coordination for National Security

Sec. 101 National Security Council

Composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Chairman of the National Securities Resources Board and such other members as the President may designate. An advisory body to the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies, so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government

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18 U. S. Congress, "Senate Committee on Armed Services Report on the National Security Act of 1947" (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office) p. 15

to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.

Sec. 102 Central Intelligence Agency

Under the National Security Council with supervisory authority and responsibility then exercised by the National Intelligence Authority created by Executive Order of the President.

Sec. 103 National Security Resources Board

To advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization and thus provide him and the N. S. C. with a sound and realistic basis on which to evaluate the objectives, committments, and risks they must consider in connection with our domestic, military, and foreign policies.

Title II - The National Military Establishment

Sec. 201 National Military Establishment

A National Military Establishment consisting of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, together with certain agencies to assist in the coordination of the activities of these Departments - headed by the Secretary of Defense to:

"1. Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all departments and agencies therein.

"2. Exercise general direction, authority, and con-

trol over such departments and agencies.

"3. Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research.

"4. Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment: formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation Act."[19]

Sec. 203 Military Assistants to the Secretary

"Officers of the Armed Services may be detailed to duty as assistants and personal aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he shall not establish a military staff."[20]

Sec. 204 Civilian Personnel

Three special assistants.

Sec. 205 Department of the Army

Changed name from Department of War.

Sec. 206 Department of the Navy

Naval aviation integrated with the naval service.

Navy responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

Marine Corps to develop landing force amphibious

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19 "National Security Act of 1947"
20 Ibid.

operations.

Sec. 207 Department of the Air Force

Established as an executive department.

Sec. 208 United States Air Force

Composed of the former Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, U. S. Army and General Headquarters, Air Force (Air Force Combat Command).

Sec. 209 Effective Date of Transfer

Sec. 210 War Council

To advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed services. Composed of the Secretary of Defense as chairman with powers of decision, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Sec. 211 Joint Chiefs of Staff

To consist of Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force and the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, if there is one. Duties: to prepare strategic and logistic plans, establish unified commands, formulate policies for joint training of the military forces and for coordinating the education of members of the military forces, to review material and personnel requirements of the Armed Forces, provide military representation in the United Nations, act as principal military advisers to the President and Sec-

retary of Defense.

Sec. 212 Joint Staff

Operating under a Director -- total not to exceed 100 - composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services.

Sec. 213 Munitions Board

Replaced Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board

Sec. 214 Research and Development Board

Replaced the Joint Research and Development Board

Title III - Miscellaneous

Sec. 301 to 311.

Chapter V

POST UNIFICATION MODIFICATIONS

The fourth and final phase of the evolution of the Defense Organization was the modifications of the unified organization established by the National Security Act of 1947. These modifications were:

National Security Act Amendments of 1949

National Security Act Amendments of 1952

Reorganization Plans 3 and 6 of 1953

As seen in the previous chapter, the National Security Act of 1947 (commonly called the Unification Act) was based on the Navy's theory of organization; centralized responsibility (Secretary of Defense) and decentralized authority (Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, Munitions Board, Research and Development Board, National Resources Board, etc.) It was what Forrestal had wanted as a result of the Eberstadt Report.

During the remainder of 1947 and the year of 1948, Forrestal gradually got the complicated Defense Organization in motion, based on the philosophy of making changes only where needed and not just for the sake of making a change. Certain minor deficiencies in the Organization came to the surface, such as the overlapping of the various boards. But the major deficiency in the organization turned out to be centered in the Secretary of Defense -- he did not have the authority to match his responsibility. The vehicle to prove this organization dilemma to Forrestal was the Defense budget.

Another area of indecision in the Defense Organization was the sub-

Chapter V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Lincoln and Fort Jackson of the nineteenth century were forerunners of the modern and present-day National Guard in the United States. These conditions may repeat:

National security may be threatened by war;

National security may be threatened by war;

Conscription (Chapter I and II) may be used;

As seen in the previous chapter, the National Security Act of 1947 (amended) called the Reserve Forces Act (RFA) into being as the Nation's reserve or organization (including National Guard) of Reserve and Regular National Military (Department of Army, Navy, and Air Force, Reserve Army Reserve and Reserve Navy, National Guard Reserve Army, etc.) It has also Federalized and served as a source of the Regular Army.

During the evolution of Lincoln and the army of today, Federalized guard only not the a National Guard organization is nothing, based on the obligations of having reserve only those cannot and not just for the sake of having a reserve. Certain above conditions in the Regular Army so the months, but as the conditions of the reserve change. The Regular Army Continuing to the organization cannot not to be reserve in the Reserve of Nation -- to the not such the authority to reserve the responsibility. The reserve to serve that conditions Guard to Regular but was the Reserve Nation.

Another area of Research is the Reserve Transformation the Regular

ject of roles and missions. Congress had purposely avoided defining the roles and missions of the Services, considering these an administrative matter, a function of the Executive Department. Troubles in this area were partially solved by the Key West Conferences, 11-14 March, 1948, the Spaatz-Tower Report, and the Newport Conference, 20-22 August, 1948.

During the summer of 1948 the Committee on the National Security Organization (a task force of the ((Hoover)) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government) began their hearings under the chairmanship of Ferdinand Eberstadt, the architect of the organization that was being analyzed. This committee submitted its report with recommendations to the Commission on 15 November, 1948.

A summary of the Report and Recommendations of this Committee follows:

"The essence of the Committee's task was to explore how the products of our national security establishment could be improved and, at the same time, the costs reduced — how to obtain the maximum security at the minimum cost in terms of our resources and liberties. . .

". . .Efficiency and economy are dependent upon the wisdom and ability of the men entrusted with its control and upon a spirit of mutual loyalty, teamwork, and unity of purpose throughout the organization. No organization is any better than the men who run it; a neat organizational chart is not a panacea for all ills. Optimum efficiency can be achieved only as the product of education and experience over a long period of time. Evolutionary processes, rather than revolutionary ones. . .

"Our present system, created by the National Security Act of 1947, is a long step forward. In terms of progress, compared with what exist-

ed at the beginning, or even at the end, of World War II, the advances have been considerable. However, in terms of securing the legitimate interests of the United States without threat of militarization of our society, and finally, in terms of maximum security at minimum cost, the present product of the system can be substantially improved. The United States is unquestionable far better prepared to deal with the complex problems of foreign and military policy, mobilization, and national defense than ever before in time of peace. The costs, at the same time, of its security organization are enormously greater, both absolutely and in relation to the national income, than ever before.

"Its investigations convinced the Committee that there are six areas or aspects in which improvement in the interest of greater efficiency and economy is both possible and necessary.

"They involve:

"1. Strengthening central authority in the military establishment;

"2. Overhauling the military budget;

"3. Improving teamwork throughout the National Security Organization;

"4. Relating scientific research and development more closely to strategic planning;

"5. Expediting plans for civilian. . .mobilization. . .;

"6. Making adequate provisions for and against new and unconventional means of warfare.

"The Committee considered and rejected:

"1. A single military Chief of Staff and general staff over all three services;

"2. Merger of the three military departments into a single department; and

"3. Merger of the naval air arm with the air force."[21]

After receiving the various Committee (Task Force) Reports and Recommendations, the Hoover Commission submitted its now famous composite report to Congress on 5 February, 1949. Its recommendations were for more authority for the Secretary of Defense including the budget and expenditures, better teamwork throughout the National military establishment, better coordination of medical services, and preparation of emergency plans for civilian and industrial mobilization. The Commission concluded:

"These provisions should insure the full control and accountability of the National Military Establishment and the full subordination of the military to civilian control by establishing the Secretary of Defense as the principal assistant to the President in military matters, responsible to him and to the Congress for the conduct, efficiency, and and economy of the National Military Establishment. Lines of command would be clear; interservice rivalries reduced by the fresh emphasis on the singleness of purpose of the total military effort; efficiency promoted and economy achieved through consistent policy and program, and through centralized control."[22]

The Congressional hearings on the amendments to the National Sec-

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21 The Committee on the National Security Organization, "Task Force Report on National Security Organization, (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1949) pp. 2-9.

22 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, "The Hoover Commission Report", (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1949) p. 197.

urity Act started soon after the submission of the Commission Report. These hearings produced a replica of the Unification fight with the Army-Air Force coalition pitted against the Navy. Forrestal's moderation saved the day. As a result of these hearings Congress passed the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Public Law 216 --81st Congress.

These Amendments provided for:

"Change in composition of the National Security Council.

"Conversion of the National Military Establishment into an Executive Department.

"Conversion of the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force to military departments in lieu of executive departments.

"Provided for a Deputy and three assistant Secretaries of Defense.

"Created the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"Increased limit of Joint Staff from 100 to 210.

"Changed the relationship of the Secretary of Defense to the Munitions Board and Research and Development Board.

"Established uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures and organizations (Title IV)."[23]

The major significance of the National Security Amendments of 1949 was that there was no change in the pattern, i.e., an organization by evolution at a time of great unrest by the American populace at the realization of the heavy burden of peacetime defense after the sacrifices of the greatest war known to man.

With the exception of minor laws passed by the 82nd Congress in

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23 U. S. Congress, "National Security Act Amendments of 1949" (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949)

under the varied duty as far as the maintenance of the Constabulary is concerned. These functions involved a variety of the distribution from such as the supply of the troops constituting garrisons throughout the state. Furnishing of provisions, water and etc. In a result of such large demands required upon the State, based causing the Commissary to duty, which the [illegible] employed.

These departments included:

Change in management of the Military Commissary Department.

Transportation of the Commissary [illegible] and [illegible] which are [illegible] within the department.

Procurement of the requirements of troops, [illegible], and the [illegible] additional departments to take [illegible] requirements.

Provided for a [illegible] and State [illegible] departments of [illegible].

Changed the [illegible] of the Commissary of the [illegible] Department of [illegible].

Discussed [illegible] of [illegible] should [illegible] [illegible].

Changed the [illegible] of the Commissary of [illegible] [illegible] State Police and Treasurer and [illegible] Board.

Reorganized [illegible] Commissary and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] (1920-1924)[27]

The major alterations of the Commissary Department of 1920 was that there were no troops in the [illegible] Army, so consequently no mobilization or no [illegible] troops to the Mexican [illegible] or the [illegible] of the Commissary Department of the Army during the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

With the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] by the State Legislature in

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27. U. S. Congress, Statistical Summary [illegible] of Army [illegible] Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, [illegible].

1952 (The Defense Supply Management Agency and Office of Director of Installations), all was quiet on the Defense Organization front until the advent of the Rockefeller Report: "Committee on Department of Defense Organization" on April 11, 1953. This was followed by President Eisenhower's message to Congress on 30 April 1953 on the reorganization of the Defense Organization including studies on the internal organization of the Service Departments.

Following hearings before the Committee on Government Operations in June, 1953, Reorganization Plan 6 became law under provision of the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended and placed in effect in the Department of Defense by D. O. D. Directive 5105.1 of 30 June, 1953.

"In his message to Congress on the Plan, President Eisenhower enumerated three objectives to be achieved:

"1. To clarify lines of authority so as to strengthen civilian responsibility.

"2. Effectiveness with economy.

"3. To improve our machinery for strategic planning."[24]

As a result of this Reorganization Plan, six new assistant Secretaries of Defense were added, as staff advisers to the Secretary of Defense, absorption of the functions of the Research and Development Board, Munitions Board, Defense Supply Management Agency, and office of the Director of Installations in the Secretary of Defense's office, transfer of the National Security Resources Board statutory functions to the office of Defense Mobilization, under Reorganization Plan 3 of

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24 John R. Probert, "Pentagon Reorganization: Phase Three", U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (Vol. 81, No. 1, January 1955) p. 53

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible] of [illegible]), and was [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] until the [illegible] of the Rockefeller Committee Recommendations on Department of Defense Organization on April 11, 1953. This was followed by President Eisenhower's message to Congress on 30 April 1953 on the reorganization of the Defense Department including changes in the internal organization of the service departments.

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"1. To clarify lines of authority so as to strengthen civilian responsibility.

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As a result of this Reorganization Plan, the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of Defense were added, as staff elements in the [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible] of the functions of the [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] Board, [illegible] [illegible] Agency, and office of the Director of Installations, to the Secretary of Defense office, [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible], while [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to

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[46] [illegible] [illegible], "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]," [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], No. [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]

1953) and placed the Joint Staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"In summary, then, the Department of Defense has become, with Reorganization Plan 6, more like the other executive departments. The Secretary's staff has been expanded. . .and authority and responsibility has been more precisely located in it, so that it can more effectively assist him in controlling the colossus for which he is responsible. At the same time, operations and much administration have remained decentralized under the Service Secretaries. Though the very controversial transfer of management functions over the Joint Staff to the chairman has reduced the power of the other members of the Joint Chiefs, they have not been submerged or subordinated."[25]

In his message to Congress submitting Reorganization Plan 6, he indicated that improvements could be made in the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Organizations. Accordingly the Secretary of Defense asked each of the military services to study and report on its organizational problems with a view toward obtaining greater effectiveness and economies wherever possible.

The following reports were submitted as a result of these studies:

Gates Report: Report of the Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy, 16 April 1954.

Davies Report: Organization of the Army, 18 December, 1953 followed by Secretary of the Army's Plan for Army Organization, 14 June 1954.

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25 Ibid. p. 62

[illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] which the decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"In summary, then, the Department of Defense was [illegible], with de-[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]."[17]

In [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] would be made in the [illegible] of the Army, Navy, and Air Force [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

The following reports were published as a result of these [illegible]:

[illegible] Report: Report of the [illegible] on [illegible] of the [illegible] of the Army, 16 [illegible] 1953.

[illegible] Report: [illegible] of the Navy, 15 December 1953 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] the Navy [illegible], 1[illegible] [illegible] 1954.

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[17] Ibid., p. 58

White Report: A Report to the Secretary of the Air Force.

The major effect of these reports was the enactment of a bill by Congress on 3 August, 1954 of a bill authorizing each Military Department to have two additional Assistant Secretaries.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters have traced the evolution of the defense organization of the United States from the American Revolution to the present day. This historical approach has shown the underlying reasons for what is contained in the defense laws and directives, and what is not contained in the laws and directives. With this background, it is possible to ponder the future possibilities of changes in the Defense Organization and at the same time to delve deeper and study the intent of the lawmakers; the intent of Congress, in this case.

What is the intent of Congress as regards our Defense Organization? The Policy Section of the "National Security Act of 1947 as Amended" reads as follows:

"It is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments, separately administered, for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including Naval Aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense, but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team

of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff (but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff.)"[26]

That is a straightforward declaration on the part of Congress and one that leaves no doubt as to their intentions. And how is this intent of Congress brought to fruition? By the people in the Organization created by the Congress to carry out their policies on national defense.

The major benefit to the country of this defense organization has been the high level integration of policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to the national security. The complexity of our modern civilization demands a high level integration of our various national policies: foreign, military, and economic. Prior to enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, high level integration of our foreign and military policy was haphazard, and as a result our foreign policy often was not backed by military reality. This influence of the National Security Council and the Defense Department on our National Policies has led to fears of militarism, but Congress has always safeguarded this by the check-rein of civilian control.

"The sole basis for the necessity of civilian control over the military is. . .the necessity for elected representatives of the people to control a ready-made instrument of great power and potential danger in a society. . .In the United States, the Constitution makes very thor-

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26 U. S. Congress, Public Law 216 - 81st Congress, "National Security Act of 1947 as Amended" Sec. 2

ough provision for civilian control of the Armed Forces. Surely every American knows full well that the President is Commander-In-Chief of the U. S. Armed Forces; perhaps not as widely understood is the fact that complimentary, and probably more powerful, control is exercised by Congress, which is charged with raising, supporting, and regulating the Armed Forces. Congress has never been backward about carrying out this proper and necessary civilian control function."[27]

Thus the basic philosophy of our post World War II Defense Organization as derived from the laws of Congress is a bigger voice for the Defense Organization in the determination of our National Policies, at the same time increasing the civilian control over the military.

A possible second major benefit to our country of this relatively new defense organization is faith of the country in the system due to the evolutionary process by which the organization came into being. The long and heavily debated case for unification was carried out in the true democratic traditions of open forum. At the time it may have been feared that the resultant organization might have been hamstrung by the bitter pros and cons aired, but acceptance was the ultimate reward.

A third possible major benifit to our country is economy of resources; men, money, and material. One of the major objectives of the National Defense Act as amended is economy. But any effort to measure or define economy in relation to our defense effort has resulted in an exercise in

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27 Lt. Col. Anthony Wermuth, U. S. Army, "Civilian Control of the Armed Forces", U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 80, No. 12 (December 1954) pp. 1341-1343

semantics. Moreover, the question of economy is of a continuing nature rather than an instantaneous savings. The objective is to preserve the peace without breaking the country.

And what about the future? If the present trend of centralization continues and Parkinson's Law[28/] holds true, the end result may be a governmental administrative giant of new and unbelievable proportions. On the other hand, the trend towards centralization of responsibility and authority in the Department of Defense may have passed its zenith. The latest change in the defense department organization was the addition of two assistant secretaries in each Service Department and the latest recommendation is to reduce the number of assistant Secretaries of Defense from nine to six.[29/] This is in contrast to the theory of Oime Lewis on leaving the Department of Interior as an Assistant Secretary. He was "of the opinion that not enough has been added upstairs in the structure of the government to take care of the great expansion below. I think there should be more assistant secretaries."[30/]

However, Secretary of Defense Wilson seems determined to hold the line, as evidenced by his refusal to support a proposal to promote the general counsels of each Service Department to assistant secretaryships.

In conclusion, the future of the Defense Organization should be one of stability. This era of stability should give each element of the Organization a chance to improve its performance. And with improved

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28 The Economist, November 19, 1955
29 A Report to the Congress by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, "Business Organization of the Department of Defense" (Washington D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office) June, 1955 p. 21
30 The Sunday Star, Washington D. C., August 1955 p. A-19

performance should come improved efficiency — more defense per tax dollar. Assuming that the trend toward centralization is over, the future emphasis will be on economy in the long haul. And the center of interest will be our double AA Janus of Aviation and the Atom. Assuming that we have the air power and the stockpile of atom weapons to annihilate the enemy and vice versa, is the quantitative differential of our destructive power meaningful?

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